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Abstract 
While the Internet is often touted as a revolutionary technology, it might be noted that democratic 
institutions have witnessed no digital revolution through the Internet. This observation leads this 
chapter to argue that the field of e-democracy has generally failed to live up to its own reformist 
rhetoric. It argues that instead of reforming government processes through technology, e-
democracy projects have tended to focus either on lowering the costs and increasing the efficiency 
of existing political processes or on analysing the civic participation that occurs outside of purpose-
built e-democracy platforms. The chapter suggests that this lack of attention to the Internet’s 
potential for systemic change in formal political institutions has little normative impact on the 
democratization of society and may even re-enforce, rather than challenge, the sociopolitical status 
quo. Further, it suggests that the current approach of e-democracy risks normalizing the Internet 
to the norms and expectations of the offline world. To elucidate this argument, this chapter 
overviews both the general trend of e-democracy projects and criticisms of those projects. Finally, 
the chapter proposes a more radical vision of e-democracy that, it suggests, would usher a larger 
potential for democratization. This more radical vision of e-democracy consists of recognizing the 
attributes of the Internet that transcend the limits of the analogue world and applying these to 
democracy. Such an approach would open the path for envisaging new political processes and 
systems, allowing the field of e-democracy to live up to its own rhetoric, and affording society the 
means to address multiple of the centuries-old problems faced by democracy. 
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Introduction 
The relatively new fields of e-government and e-democracy have largely focused on the potentials 
of the Internet to support and deepen democracy. They have sought to leverage the Internet to 
promote more transparent government, increased accountability, citizen-centred services, 
distributed association, simplified petition and contestation, more responsive representatives, and 
the re-engagement of citizens. Yet, while these advances introduce technology into government, 
they fail to leverage technology to fundamentally transform government. This chapter will discuss 
the limitations of e-democracy projects in defining a strong direction for reforming government 
through technology. It will build the case that the potential of e-democracy touted by the 
discipline’s own rhetoric has not been achieved and that, to more fully achieve this potential, a 
radical vision of e-democracy must be adopted. To develop and support this argument, the chapter 
will, first, situate reformist rhetoric within the early radical aspirations associated with e-
democracy. It will then argue that both e-democracy projects and criticisms of those projects have 
largely diverged from these aspirations—and that this divergence may have contributed to 
promoting incremental improvements in government processes over fundamental advancement of 
those processes. Finally, the chapter will argue that future research needs to move beyond the 
framework of past approaches in order to fulfil e-democracy’s core promise of fundamentally 
reforming government and deepening democracy. 
 
The Lost Foundations of E-Democracy 
The aspiration to democratize society through electronics can be traced to an epoch well before 
the Internet, and indeed before the mass commercialization of personal computers—e-democracy 
might be said to have arisen from an electrical vision of distributed democracy in a largely 
analogue era. On 9 April 1940, Buckminster Fuller, the American author and architect, envisioned 
a system of futuristic distributed voting whereby citizens would vote from their homes using 
telephones. Following the commercialization of television, in the 1962 preface to his book, Fuller 
extended this possibility to two-way televisions. At a time of growing dictatorships, Fuller wrote 
that electrified voting ‘…promises a household efficiency superior to any government of record 
because it incorporates not only the speed of decision which is the greatest strength of the dictator, 
but additional advantages which can never be his’ (Fuller 1971, p. 11). Having citizens vote on 
issues from home would be collaborative—certifying ‘spontaneous popular co-operation in the 
carrying out of each decision’ (Fuller 1971, p. 11). This constant input from citizens would allow 
a rational progression of the governance process—‘continuous correction of the course, or even 
complete reaction, should (and as) experience indicate desirability, without political scapegoating’ 
(Fuller 1971, p. 11). In telephones and television, and more precisely in their architecture, Fuller 
saw the potential for a more active role for citizens, as well as the establishment of a new relation 
between the citizen and the state. 
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The e-democracy literature rarely explicitly recognizes its lineage to Fuller. Yet, the significance 
of a tracing e-democracy to Fuller is not only historiographical—it is also thematic and 
methodological. While chronology might place Fuller’s proposal on the outskirts of what might 
contemporarily be considered as ‘e-democracy’, the concept of household voting envisioned by 
Fuller can be situated within the e-democracy lineage because it reassesses political processes 
through information and communication technologies (ICTs). In this sense, Fuller’s ‘electrified 
voting’ transcends simple novelty in engineering to breach the realm of technology with the realms 
of political theory and philosophy. He presented no plan for how such a system would work in 
practice but proposed its possibility—the system may work or it might not work, but, he argued, 
it should at least be considered (Fuller 1971, p. 12). The qualities of this consideration, even if 
intangible and practically unrealized, provide a bedrock for what radical e-democracy might 
become, even if it still has not almost a hundred years later: it challenges the perceived limits of 
the physical world, highlights the ideals of our societies, and reconsiders how democracy might 
attain these ideals. 
Political theory and philosophy have played a central role in the development of e-democracy, 
even if these considerations might be minimized today in favour of a focus on the incremental 
development of government through technology. The distributed, neutral, and fast nature of the 
Internet distinguishes it from previous large-scale communication technologies, including from 
those Fuller toyed with, such as radio and television. The architectural uniqueness of the Internet 
has been cast, especially by academics, as an opportunity to democratize society to unprecedented 
levels. Perhaps this is in part because the digital world allows bypassing constraints on democracy 
imposed by the non-digital world. The 1990s saw the growth of a technological counterculture, 
with the growth of utopian rhetoric predicting an ‘Internet revolution’; indeed, even politicians, 
such as Howard Dean, explored the prospect of democratic deliberation through electronic town 
meetings. In the 2000s, the collaborative and distributed nature of the Internet leveraged by Web 
2.0 highlighted the potential for participatory renewal through collaborative technology. In the 
2010s, the use of technology by social movements around the world to associate, challenge the 
status quo, and sometimes topple totalitarian governments from the ground up further fuelled the 
rhetoric associated with e-democracy. Paulin (2015) has written of ‘powerful myths’ fuelling the 
integration of technology and government—and indeed, the framing of e-democracy as a 
revolutionary field has been shaped by the amorphous and varied phenomena, platforms and events 
of the last three decades. 
Yet, despite the rhetoric, it seems implausible to attribute fundamental political changes to the field 
of e-democracy. Normatively, the role of political theory and philosophy is perhaps minimized 
today in favour of playing ‘catch up’ with the technological developments. Empirically, e-
democracy has focused either on (1) building platforms for democracy or (2) analysing use of the 
Internet occurring outside of e-democracy platforms. E-democracy platforms include e-voting (the 
online version of voting), e-petitions (the online version of petitions), and portals that allow 
citizens to email their representatives (the online version of telephoning or writing a letter to 
government). These tend to leverage the Internet’s architecture to lower the costs of existing 
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processes or to make these processes more efficient. Yet they have for the most part failed to 
galvanize public opinion, foster a mass renewal in participation, challenge core problems of 
democracy, or fundamentally reform political processes. 
On the other side of the e-democracy field are projects that apply outside theories and constructs 
(especially social, psychological, and economic constructs) to analyse participation occurring on 
the Internet that is perceived as being significant to democracy. For example, a multitude of e-
democracy studies have analysed social media that have facilitated the decentralized organization 
of mass movements (such as Occupy) as well as revolutions (such as the Arab Spring) through the 
Internet. While both the platforms developed by e-democracy and the analysis of participatory 
politics occurring outside of e-democracy borrow and add momentum to the radial rhetoric of e-
democracy as a field, it is rare that these two approaches to e-democracy fundamentally question 
the democratic processes or envision the creation of new ones through technology. Further, it is 
perhaps telling that the activity deemed to have democratic significance that is most frequently 
analysed in e-democracy is activity occurring outside of purpose-built e-democracy platforms. 
The attention that the Internet has drawn for its potential for radical change appears not to have 
resulted in any radical change for democracy: power relations within Western societies have 
perhaps been entrenched rather than altered, and the centuries-old structures that in democracy are 
expected to translate societal values to political outcomes remain largely unchanged. The field of 
e-democracy which by its name asserts to bridge electronic technology and democracy, and further 
to this might be assumed to promote democracy, has been largely inert in attempting to realize 
radical changes to democracy. To grasp the extent of this inertia, the following section will explore 
the approach of e-democracy towards ‘civic participation’, which due in part to its central 
significance for political theory, is a common theme in e-democracy research. 
 
Wariness Towards Digital Novelty: The Example of Participation 
Radical visions of e-democracy have met strong criticism from within the e-democracy field that 
challenge the significance of Internet phenomena to formal political application. It was a common 
aspiration amongst the utopians of the 1990s that the Internet would democratize society. This was 
largely associated with the Internet having a distributed architecture and allowing cheap and 
neutral communication over large distances. It was also coupled with high expectations of citizens’ 
motivation, ability, and wishes—framing the Internet as a conduit for such democratic virtues as 
increased citizen participation in government. Hence, multiple models of e-democracy have taken 
the approach that providing a platform for participation through the Internet will itself contribute 
to democratizing society. This ‘if you build it they will come’ was based on, as it has been framed 
by Paulin, a ‘purified image of a reinvented, new and better government, serving a new generation 
of omnirational, tech-savvy citizens’ (Paulin 2015, p. 1). While some scholars have theorized that 
the Internet does promote engagement because of its architecture and the cyberspace that emerges 
from it (e.g. Benkler 2006), numerous academics have argued against this, suggesting that the 
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Internet either does not provide significant opportunity of participation or that it does not stimulate 
political engagement. Indeed, amongst others, Buchstein (1997), Sunstein (2009), Margolis and 
Moreno-Riaño (2013), and Shapiro (1999) have argued that Internet use may weaken rather than 
strengthen political participation. Common amongst these views is that, ‘central features of the 
Internet… generally undermine the sort of public sphere and political interaction that is required 
for genuine democratic deliberation’ (Bohman 2004, p. 131), thus fundamentally limiting Internet-
based e-democracy. These two criticisms—that the Internet does not provide the conditions 
necessary for democracy and that e-democracy overlies on an unreasonable expectation of 
participation—are two prevalent criticisms of the field that may have stumped the development of 
Internet-based participatory democracy models. 
The premise of these criticisms is partly based on the notion that online exchange lacks some of 
the communicative intricacies of face-to-face interactions. For one current of thought, this notion 
promotes equality and rational discussion—the minimized social context of Internet-based 
communication may bode well for democracy by reducing socio-economic prejudice as income, 
education, race, and skin colour are not immediately displayed (Witschge 2004, pp. 116–117). Yet 
for another current, computer-mediated communication does not eliminate such discrimination but 
supports the development of non-visual methods of identifying socio-economic qualities and 
alternative criteria for judging others (Kollock and Smith 2002). Further, beyond the immediate 
lack of general socio-economic cues, there may also be a lack of the social cues that are postulated 
to foster thick online communities, including those indicating trust, familiarity, stability, and social 
pressure (Van den Hoven 2005, p. 53). The lack of these hints, it is argued, reduces social 
interaction to a state where association is impeded, thus ‘eroding the supply of social capital so 
critical to democracy’ (Chambers et al. 2005, p. 125), and consequently limiting the formation of 
cohesive communities that support genuine, rational–critical exchange. For others, the online 
world is so far removed from what is perceived to be the ‘real world’ outside of the Internet that 
heavily relying on the Internet threatens awareness of reality. According to this perspective, 
communicating extensively through computers leads to a process of ‘de-realization’, which in turn 
creates artificial desires and needs (Buchstein 1997, p. 250). By distancing citizens from political 
and social realities, computer-mediated communication may limit the ability of citizens to 
ascertain issues and grasp the viability of potential solutions. The general notion underlying these 
criticisms of e-democracy is that the Internet and ICTs are unable to provide as rich of an 
environment as the offline world, and it is consequently concluded that any form of e-democracy 
that relies heavily on online association and deliberation will necessarily be less effective than the 
current, non-virtual democratic processes of the offline world. 
A similar criticism of e-democracy is that the quality of democratic participation on the Internet is 
not sufficient to fulfil the assumptions of many normative models of democracy and may instead 
lead to political polarization. From one perspective, this has to do with the lack of inclusion in the 
Internet demographic. From another perspective, it has to do with the dynamics of online 
participation and the outcomes of that participation. Anonymity and distance promoted by 
computer-mediated communication have been postulated to encourage uncivil deliberation that is 
Page 8 of 14 
 
neither rational nor critical. This finds evidence in discourteous, unaccepting, and disrespectful 
online behaviour. The phenomenon of ‘flaming’ is perhaps the most obvious of these. Although 
Witschge recognizes that ‘anonymity and the absence of social presence, which seemed so 
promising for democracy, can instead work against a genuine democratic exchange’ (Witschge 
2004, p. 115), she advocates that rules and guidelines can increase civility and notes further that 
‘we do not know whether these online uncivil behaviours have the same effect as the offline ones 
would have’ (Witschge 2004, p. 116). Additionally, there is a fear that Internet users are unwilling 
to critically question their own opinions and weigh those of others, but instead seek out interaction 
with like-minded individuals (Bellamy and Raab 1999; Sunstein 2009). According to Bellamy and 
Raab (1999), this would lead to a balkanization of politics and a fragmentation of the online sphere. 
Such views have been largely supported by empirical studies of online deliberation (Wright and 
Street 2007, p. 852). Buchstein (1997) assimilated this to a process of ‘show and tell’ wherein 
users exposit their arguments independently from others, but doing so in such an aggressive 
manner that it becomes a process of ‘show and yell’. Finally, there is a fear that if electronic 
discussions gain importance, it would foster extreme views as individuals are increasingly fostered 
within their own communities. This strongly challenges the ability of the Internet to inform citizens 
and form consensus. 
An additional common criticism of e-democracy is that it overly relies on rational participation. 
Whether online or offline, and whether through deliberation or voting, participatory democracy 
demands political engagement from citizens. Citizens are expected to take time to understand, 
review or monitor, and act on the political agenda—a far cry from the sometimes-held idea of the 
modern citizen as alienated and apathetic. Technology can be viewed as either enhancing or 
reducing political various ideals. As Iyengar and Ansolabehere (2010) argue, for instance, 
campaign advertising over televisions help to inform citizens about candidates, but may promote 
a ‘spectacle democracy’ that supports consuming politics rather than actively contributing to it. 
Support that new approaches to technology might (contrary to traditional uses of television) 
promote participation came perhaps most fervently from Becker and Slaton, who claimed that 
Televote projects ‘profoundly contradict the portrayal of the American “couch potato”, a nation 
full of potbellied male dolts who would never swap their six-packs of beer and recliners in front 
of the television set for Styrofoam cups and plastic chairs at a public policy forum’ (Becker and 
Slaton 2000, p. 95) and insisted that ‘almost all of the designers of these projects have been amazed 
at the gratitude of ordinary citizens for being asked and included’ (Becker and Slaton 2000, p. 95). 
Yet, criticism of this basic premise that citizens are motivated to participate more actively in 
politics, a criticism to which Becker and Slaton were responding, has been an explicit challenge to 
e-democracy from the earliest days of the formal discipline. For instance, as early as 1987, in his 
survey of television and telephone-based e-democracy, Christopher Arterton ‘found little support 
for the notion that citizens have the interest necessary to sustain near universal participation’ 
(Arterton 1987, p. 197). Still today, along these lines, e-democracy is sometimes viewed as being 
unrealistic and overly ideal—as Matt Qvortrup states, e-democracy is seen as ‘an ideal pursued by 
super-engaged citizens, not as a serious contribution to increasing public participation’ (Qvortrup 
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2007, p. 67). In addition to the question of whether citizens are motivated in the absolute sense—
that is whether they would participate more directly in politics if given the chance—is the question 
of whether citizens may be motivated by ICTs in the relative sense—that is whether the Internet 
might foster greater participation than did the pre-Internet world. 
Despite optimism from utopians that the Internet will lower boundaries to participation, the 
validity of the expectation that the Internet will engage users has been the focus of both theoretical 
and empirical challenges. One approach is that the sheer amount of information online increases 
information costs above any reduction that might occur because of the Internet’s architecture. This 
argument that users suffer from ‘information overload’, whilst being of a rationalist perspective, 
suggests that the Internet may actually be detrimental to democracy as too much information is 
spent on filtering information rather than accessing new information. As van den Hoven states, 
‘the average citizen is not willing to incur the information cost and transaction cost associated with 
political deliberation’ (Van den Hoven 2005, p. 53). Another approach is that the rationalist 
perspective is too narrow and that a simple cost-and-benefit perspective fails to address more 
complex problems inhibiting motivation. Christopher Arteton, writing about television and 
telephone models, postulated that lowered costs of communication would not increase 
participation to the degree required by plebiscitary notions of e-democracy. For Arteton, the issue 
of motivation appears to transcend rationalist weighing to a deeper-rooted lack of interest in 
politics—he writes that ‘in practice, too few are interested enough to make plebiscites a feasible 
means of policy making’ (Arterton 1987, p. 197) and estimates that if citizens were given the 
opportunity for direct democracy through ICTs, ‘probably around two thirds will not participate’ 
(Arterton 1987, p. 197). Although Bimber (1998) suggested that the Internet may allow for higher 
paced government in which representatives respond to issues from emergent groups, he also 
dispelled the ideal that the Internet increases participation from the bottom-up. Bimber noted that 
although cross-sectional data does show that citizens who are more informed participate more than 
those who are less informed, longitudinal data does not support this. As he writes, ‘none of the 
major developments in communication in the Twentieth Century produced any aggregate gain in 
citizen participation. Neither telephones, radio, nor television exerted a net positive effect on 
participation, despite the fact that they apparently reduced information costs and improved 
citizens’ access to information’ (Bimber 1998, p. 57). Turning to the Internet, Bimber found that 
political interest was less associated with using the Internet than watching television or reading 
newspapers, and that donating money was the only type of participation that aligned with Internet 
use (Bimber 2001, p. 53). 
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New Technology, Old Ideas: The Core Problem and Risks of E-Democracy 
What is missed by the usual conversations in e-democracy, but becomes increasingly obvious as 
the field’s research is contrasted with its rhetoric, is that new technology permits the exploration 
of new ideas. Having largely circumvented this point, e-democracy has replicated old ideas using 
new technology. This might be at least in part due to a lack of awareness as to what makes the 
Internet unique in relation to the pre-Internet world, or to a lack of creativity as to how to apply 
this uniqueness of the Internet to politics. The dangers of this tendency of e-democracy to apply 
the Internet to further the status quo are multiple. First, there is missed opportunity of unrealized 
potential. Second, there is the risk of normalizing the Internet to the offline world through future 
technical, social, or legal decisions—chopping down the unique tangled branches of the Internet 
so as to form a ubiquitous, but standardized and characterless square that more easily integrates 
our current development needs. 
The Internet has largely been applied to further the political status quo rather than exploring 
alternative democratic futures. That is instead of realizing the potential of the Internet to produce 
alternative power structures or political processes, e-democracy has largely sought to assess how 
the Internet can replicate existing democratic processes: Bulletin Board Systems, Usenet, 
Facebook, Twitter, and Meetup may have facilitated association and civic action at previously 
unattainable levels, but when used in e-democracy they largely reproduce the processes behind or 
provide an interface to, offline association and communication; urban democracy projects such as 
Paris’ DansMaRue, which allows Parisians to report broken benches or graffiti to the city, do little 
more than replace other municipal communication channels; local democracy platforms, such as 
the use of Twitter in the Spanish town of Jun, supplement or replace bureaucracy, but keep 
fundamental processes of representation in place; online campaigning and new media may provide 
an edge to tech-savvy campaigns—facilitating political communication in much the same was as 
they did for Howard Dean, or increasing the base of campaign financing as they did for Barack 
Obama—but they do not deeply change political systems; e-voting and online petitions may 
facilitate consultation of citizens by governments but, even in nations such as Estonia that have 
deployed electronic voting at the large scale over multiple election cycles, these new tools of e-
democracy only reproduce existing processes behind offline voting and contacting representatives. 
This is not to say that e-democracy exactly replicates offline ‘tools’ of democracy—online 
petitions on an official government website, with supporting legislation, do facilitate identifying 
policy issues and public opinion distinctly and more efficiently than do form letters or phone calls 
to representatives, and likewise, online voting distinguishes itself from offline voting, and through 
this distinction might lower burdens and increase participation. However, it is to say that for a 
large part e-democracy reproduces the ‘processes’ behind offline forms of participation. For 
example, online voting automates, but does not change the way electoral systems work—
candidates must still be presented to citizens, citizens must still actively cast votes, and votes are 
still tallied similarly to how they were before. Indeed, by the time an election ends—and citizens 
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have streamed campaign videos to their mobile phones, commented on attack ads in threaded 
discussions, associated through social media groups and hashtags, assessed and discussed the 
political platforms of the candidates, and optimistically clicked their mouse buttons on the name 
of their preferred candidate—it may very well be that, in the grand scheme of politics, 
representation, and power relations, very little has changed. 
Similarly, criticisms of e-democracy fall into the same trap of replication—but replicate 
assumptions rather than processes. For instance, the retort that e-democracy should avoid 
deliberate models because the Internet does not uphold many assumptions of the offline world 
sidesteps the potential for deliberate models based on alternative assumptions. Whereas it is 
conceivable that the Internet might not provide the social cues necessary to foster the ‘thick 
communities’ of the local town hall, or the ‘rational deliberation’ of the highly formalized meetings 
of experts and bearcats, it is also conceivable that it provides other assets for democracy. Indeed, 
e-democracy could frame the uniqueness of the Internet as an asset for democracy—and through 
this reframing, thick communities consisting of anchored identities may give way to ephemeral 
communities of fluid identities, wherein membership may be dynamic in much the same way that 
human spontaneity and intellectual exploration can be dynamic. Similarly, anonymity might be 
reframed from permitting unconstructive discourse (e.g. flaming and trolling) to, instead, allowing 
the removal of an identity-centred threat imposed on the civic discourse of individuals by society. 
The lack of the threat of having one’s intellectual production linked to a single personal identifier 
(such as a name) might free individuals from society’s traditional reliance on consistent identities, 
to allow individuals to participate with alternative and even conflicting identities. If e-democracy 
recognizes these unique attributes of the Internet, it can explore a larger array of alternative 
political futures. 
It is unclear as to whether the prescriptive approach common in e-democracy will continue and, if 
it does, what the relevance of the field will be to modernity. In a very specific sense, as Internet 
penetration has increased and user behaviour shifted, it is questionable whether many of the 
criticisms mentioned in the last section remain true today. For example, contrary to Bimber, a 
cross-modal study by Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) found that, on three nearly identical 
surveys conducted by Internet, telephone and mail, opt-in Internet, respondents were more 
politically informed than respondents from the other modes. In addition, they were more likely to 
report contributing to political campaigns and to obtain less of their news from television 
(Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014, pp. 11–12). Xenos and Moy (2007) found from an analysis of 
the 2004 American National Election Studies that there is only mixed support for both the 
rationalist and the psychological approach—the authors found that information acquisition and use 
conforms more to the rational perspective while more general political and civic participation 
conforms more to psychological perspective. More generally, the simultaneous development of 
Internet phenomena and the integration of the Internet in daily life increasingly highlight the 
tensions between ageing political institutions and the modern society that those institutions serve. 
From this more general perspective of the zeitgeist, it is conceivable that there might be an 
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increasingly evident societal need for a reformed e-democracy field that is Internet-sensitive and 
non-prescriptive. 
The dangers of continuing the current approach of the e-democracy field are multiple. First, 
framing the digital world through traditional, pre-digital perspectives limits advances to those that 
fit within those traditional perspectives. This may suppress the emergence of new perspectives. 
Like Maslow’s law of the instrument—‘if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail’ 
(Maslow 1965, p. 15)—viewing the digital world through a pre-digital lens obscures new aspects 
of the Internet that may be fundamentally different from the offline world, and thus whose 
application might fundamentally impact the offline world. In the field of e-democracy, seeking out 
how Internet technologies can be mobilized within the confines of our existing governance risks 
maintaining the status quo and overlooking alternative political structures and futures. This favours 
incremental changes based on the lowest common denominator of shared attributes between the 
Internet and society. This is in part because applying the architecture of the Internet to existing 
political structures may have quantitative results (such as increasing efficiency and lowering 
costs), but does not bring into question the underlying processes that those structures support. 
Second, disregarding the unique attributes of the Internet may in turn minimize or suppress these 
attributes in a process of normalization. Without a base to protect these unique attributes of the 
Internet, the Internet may be normalized to the offline world. This may occur to fit the traditional 
expectations or structures of society. Over the last two decades, this has been witnessed in digital 
access and controls aiming to protect pre-digital commercial interests (such as the movie or music 
industries) from emerging methods of association and cultural production (e.g. peer-to-peer and 
remix culture). Finally, the incremental developments favoured by e-democracy, taken together, 
risk further strengthen the injustices and structural weaknesses of democracy. Indeed, by shaping 
technological advances after existing institutions, e-democracy may act to consolidate the 
ascendency of existing institutions over their potential alternatives—leading some to observe, for 
instance, that ‘the digital era seems to be merely another noteworthy change in environment which 
the bureaucracy aims to survive’ (Paulin 2015, p. 4). This strengthening may serve to extend the 
life of political institutions or processes that would otherwise be replaced or have a greater need 
to be replaced, in line with the continual evolution of societal values. In short, being more sensitive 
to how the unique aspects of the Internet can fundamentally improve governance would both 
encourage developing alternative perspectives for democracy, protect the organic evolution of the 
Internet, and promote democratic renewal. 
 
Conclusion 
The tragedy of e-democracy is that the field misses the opportunity to fulfil its own aims. This 
chapter has argued that while the Internet presents a myriad of opportunities for radically 
democratizing government, the core field expected to explore democratization through technology 
has largely sidestepped these opportunities. The role of technology in affecting power relations 
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and control structures appears to be increasingly subordinated to the political status quo. E-
democracy has focused on incremental developments to democracy, many of which consist in 
applying the efficiency and cost reduction enabled by the Internet to streamline or replicate, albeit 
in digital form, existing government processes. Hence, the participatory tools proposed by e-
democracy strongly resemble those of the offline world, and the approach of modern e-democracy 
can be situated well before the popularization of the Web and the emergence of Web-oriented 
concepts. E-democracy’s apparent outcomes of increased efficiency, greater inclusion of 
marginalized groups, and facilitated access to information have been incremental rather than 
structural—and consequently no ‘Internet revolution’ has occurred in government. By applying 
new technology to political structures that are centuries old, not only is e-democracy missing a 
large opportunity for impacting democracy through technology, but it also risks normalizing the 
Internet to the norms of the offline world, as well as emphasizing the current political system, with 
its structural vulnerabilities and the perceived injustices of its political outcomes. In conclusion, e-
democracy must transcend its current ideology of incremental change in order to tap into a larger 
potential for fundamental change. New directions, including Internet Democracy, liquid 
democracy, peer-to-peer governance, block chain democracy, decentralized autonomous 
organizations, and wiki-based government are all examples of future directions that e-democracy 
might take in order to move digital-era government beyond the vestiges of the industrial era—that 
is ‘beyond bureaucracy’. 
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